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 Summary: The paper explores the issue of national culture and tra-
dition within the framework of the EU internal market. It presents a 
discussion on the legitimacy of European economic integration. The 
author takes as a starting point the motto ‘Europe united in diversity’ 
and discusses the meaning of diversity in the fi eld of the internal mar-
ket. The paper emphasises the importance of institutional analysis in 
EU market law and analyses constitutional relations between nation-
al and supranational levels of government in the internal market fi eld. 
Legal practice in the internal market (the case law of the EU Court and 
legislation) shows a pro-centralistic orientation, within which several 
aspects of national culture and tradition have been sacrifi ced. How-
ever, the Court and EU legislator have not openly discussed differ-
ent institutional alternatives; instead they have mostly referred to the 
benefi ts of the established rules for the majority of European citizens. 
In doing so, they have eroded national regulatory autonomy in the 
market fi eld and many important aspects of national tradition and 
culture have been sacrifi ced for reasons of pursuing an ideal internal 
market, eg national food and drink laws (Italian pasta rules and Ger-
man beer production), rules on working days (Sunday trading) and 
hours (e.g. Spanish siesta), the metrical system, etc. The European 
process of market law uniformity, however, is contestable when as-
sessed in the light of democratic legitimacy. In this regard, the paper 
analyses the effects of the principle of subsidiarity on institutional 
analysis in the fi eld of the EU internal market.
1 Introduction: diverse interests and uniform rules
In terms of its Member States’ economic development and natural 
features, as well as the traditional cultures and values of their differ-
ent political systems, the EU is internally very diverse. In this respect, 
the EU’s enlargement from fi fteen to twenty-seven Member States with 
a total population of almost 500 million does not just mean more of the 
same, but a further increase in diversity. Enlargement brought twelve 
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new languages and plenty of new political alliances among the states. It 
brought twelve relatively unknown national cultures (to the old Member 
States) and numerous minority languages and cultures that have more 
than doubled the number of minorities in the EU.1
In such a diverse system, the appropriateness of uniform rules for 
all is contentious.2 The appropriateness of legal rules is measured by 
the standard of living in a specifi c area, considering that inhabitants 
of wealthier regions are prepared to pay more for health, environmental 
protection and public security than inhabitants of poorer areas. In ad-
dition, individuals’ tastes differ from one region to another, thereby in-
fl uencing the appropriateness of legal provisions. The majority’s attitude 
towards gambling or pornographic material depends upon the religious 
and cultural background of the inhabitants in a certain area. Direct 
geographical factors can also sometimes infl uence the content of law, eg 
some time ago, the Dutch government defended a Royal Decree before 
the Court that provided for a certain percentage of vitamin D in marga-
rine by saying that people acquire vitamins from sunshine and that in 
countries which receive less sunshine, such as the Netherlands, indi-
viduals need to increase their vitamin D levels by consuming it through 
their food and that it was thus legitimate that the legislature address the 
vitamin shortage issue by means of law.3 This means that the advan-
tages and disadvantages of legal rules for inhabitants of certain regions 
vary and so does the optimum content of legal provisions.4 Toggenburg 
therefore metaphorically says that diversity is a wild and chameleon-like 
animal with thousands of heads that can hardly be kept in a cage of a 
single legal principle.5
The uniformity of legal rules, however, is not only practically prob-
lematic, but also undesirable from the point of view of democratic legiti-
macy, which is a precondition for any democratic society. The cultural 
diversity of the EU Member States and distinct national sentiments pre-
vent the EU from legitimately adopting uniform rules to deal with the 
1  For a discussion on the impact of the last two enlargements upon EU law, see M Jozon, 
‘The Enlarged EU and Mandatory Requirements’ (2005) 11(5) European Law Journal 549.
2  JR Macey, ‘Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regula-
tion: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism’ (1990) 76 Virginia Law Review 265, 
281; I Markovits, ‘Reconcilable Differences’ (1999) 47 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 189.
3  Case C-273/94 Commission v Netherlands [1996] ECR I-31.
4  JL Goldsmith and AO Sykes, ‘The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2001) 
101 Yale Law Journal 785, 790.
5  GN Toggenburg, ‘Unifi cation via Diversifi cation - What does it Mean to be “United in Di-
versity”?’ (2004) EUMAP online journal <http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2004/
bigday/diversity> accessed 1 December 2006.
119CYELP 8 [2012] 117-142
diverse problems of its Member States.6 This is true also for the internal 
market fi eld. The internal market has in principle been established, but 
nevertheless remains a subject of numerous discussions. The reason for 
this is that various EU legal documents call for an increase in its effec-
tiveness.7 While discussing the effectiveness of the internal market, the 
issue of the legitimacy of EU market rules must be considered as well. 
The latter should present the essential aspect of any analysis of market 
success, given that legitimacy gives a broader quality to market rules, 
ensuring a more consistent application, while on the other hand illegiti-
mate market rules, irrespective of how ideal a market they establish in 
theory, can hardly be enforceable in practice and therefore cannot be 
regarded as effective in democratic legal systems.
 This paper argues that the principle of subsidiarity as an answer 
to a democratic legitimacy defi cit in the EU has a vital role to play when 
choosing between various institutional alternatives (centralist and de-
centralist concepts) and should also have an important impact upon the 
division of powers between the EU institutions and its Member States 
in the fi eld of the internal market, especially in terms of preserving na-
tional traditions and cultures.8
2 Institutional alternatives in the EU internal market
2.1 Centralist and decentralist market approaches
The ongoing economic crisis proves that the market cannot self-reg-
ulate. Therefore, economic autonomy cannot be an option for the future. 
Should we agree that legal intervention in the market is necessary, the 
next step is to determine who the competent authority is for such inter-
vention. The main constitutional law alternatives for regulating the EU 
market are the institutions of the Member States (as the historically pri-
mary regulators of their respective national markets) and the EU institu-
tions (as relatively new regulators of the common/internal market, which 
6  Central authorities may certainly adopt rules that change from one territory to another. 
However, this is not their usual modus operandi (at least not in the EU). For the new Mem-
ber States that have only recently rebuilt their sovereignty, it is even more important that 
they do not lose their identity within the EU and that they can defend their special national 
interests.
7  See Commission, ‘Europe 2020, A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ 
COM (2010) 2020 fi nal; M Monti, ‘A New Strategy for the Single Market: At the Service of 
Europe’s Economy and Society’ (2010) Report to the President of the European Commission 
<http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_fi nal_10_05_2010_en.pdf> accessed 11 Sep-
tember 2011; Commission, ‘Single Market Act: twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen 
confi dence “Working together to create new growth” COM(2011) 206 fi nal.
8  For more on this, see LFM Besselink, ‘Respecting Constitutional Identity in the EU’ (2012) 
CML Rev 671-693.
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in the past fi fty years have acquired the central role in this fi eld). In this 
regard, the question of the relationship between the two levels of the in-
stitutions arises, thereby refl ecting an antagonism between demands for 
a greater diversity on the one hand and a broad uniformity of internal 
market rules on the other. What an analysis of the institutional alterna-
tives of the EU internal market requires is therefore an assessment of the 
constitutional legal status of the EU economic order as refl ected in the 
legislation and case law in this core EU legal fi eld.
The basic constitutional confl ict in the fi eld of the internal market is 
a confl ict between centralism and decentralism.9 These are two funda-
mental approaches of legal theory to the issue of the constitutional legal 
nature of the EU internal market. Centralism in this context refers to a 
system in which the EU regulates most economic activities and where the 
competences of the Member States are generally excluded (a laissez-faire 
approach). Decentralism, on the other hand, refers to a system, in which 
most aspects of economic regulation are left to the Member States (a lais-
sez-régler approach). However, the latter are bound by the principles of 
free movement of goods, services, people and capital. Decentralism, as 
understood in this paper, therefore refers to a limited decentralism, as 
it is based on the limited autonomy of the Member States. The fi rst ap-
proach defends a wide-ranging transformation of internal market rules 
into a free-trade commitment where the market rules form the basis for 
economic liberalism, an open market and free competition. The second 
approach, on the other hand, considers that the only purpose of the rules 
on free movement is to limit state protectionism and discrimination. 
Although each of these approaches has its advantages and disad-
vantages, a decentralist approach gives preference to democratic values, 
whereas a centralist one favours economic effectiveness. Democracy and 
economic effectiveness are thus contradictory values. Should one only 
choose economic effi ciency as a factor of choice between the institutional 
alternatives, then the choice will certainly be oriented towards central-
ism. On the other hand, if the main goal is the preservation of national 
sovereignty, a decentralist approach will be given preference. In case nei-
ther of the goals is to be disregarded, an appropriate balance between 
centralism and decentralism must be established when considering vari-
ous institutional alternatives in the market.
Ever since the Treaty of Rome came into effect, economic arguments 
have prevailed in the internal market establishment process: market lib-
eralisation to increase competitiveness and to achieve economy of scales 
comparable to the production of companies from Europe’s competitive 
9  J Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law: A Study of the Relationship between the Freedoms 
(OUP 2002) 32.
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markets. In this process, however, it is often forgotten that market rules 
spread to very diverse legal fi elds and that such centralistic regulation is 
not always the most justifi able, and may be in opposition to the interests 
of diversity. In the EU, diversity is an increasingly obvious fact. It has 
been declared the most notable characteristic of integration,10 and at 
the same time has become a legal concept. Affi rming the competences of 
decentralist authorities in certain legal fi elds may in this respect achieve 
greater democratic legitimacy for the adopted rules, as it preserves the 
diversity of national rules.
2.2 Choice of institutional alternatives in the fi eld of the EU 
internal market in practice
Although the Court and EU legislators in no respect advocate com-
plete deregulation, the judgments of the Court and EU secondary legis-
lation in the market fi eld considerably limit Member States’ prospects 
to adopt or preserve diverse market rules. This, however, is disputable 
considering the undoubted orientation of citizens towards their states as 
primary forums for democratic activities. Deriving from the widely ad-
opted thesis that a true European demos does not exist, uniform market 
rules, which are built on the idea that European citizens have the same 
needs and a unifi ed perspective of the world, raise questions regarding 
the democratic legitimacy of such rules.
In order to increase the legitimacy of EU market rules, the Court 
has transformed the Member States’ obligations, imposed by the Trea-
ties, into individual rights of EU citizens which are enforceable before the 
national courts. The Court has justifi ed most of its internal market judg-
ments on the basis of the economic constitution theory that considers 
the freedom of individuals as the ultima ratio of market intervention by 
central institutions. Consequently, the Court’s decisions (at least at fi rst 
sight) do not solve the confl icts between the EU and its Member States, 
but protect the rights of individuals from these states - in some cases 
against their home states. Since the Court relies on the assumed will 
of the majority of citizens when justifying its decisions, in theory it is a 
majoritarian approach. Even though the Court has not openly discussed 
the importance of market rule interpretations for the constitutional divi-
sion of competence, and even though the Court has avoided interference 
in political debates by wrapping its decisions in the language of individu-
10  The EU motto that fi rst came into use in 2000 is ‘Europe - united in diversity’ and is 
explained as signifying ‘how Europeans have come together, in the form of the EU, to work 
for peace and prosperity, while at the same time being enriched by the continent’s many 
different cultures, traditions and languages’ European Union < http://europa.eu/about-
eu/basic-information/symbols/motto/index_en.htm> accessed 27 July 2011.
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als’ fundamental freedoms, its rulings in this fi eld nevertheless include 
decisions on the division of competences among Member States and EU 
institutions. Various interpretations of the internal market rules neces-
sarily lead to the determination of the institutions that are responsible 
for market regulation.11 When increasing and limiting the scope of le-
gal principles in the market fi eld, the Court actually in a discretionary 
manner determines which competences the Member States should have 
and in which fi elds they may not intervene, as they are reserved for the 
EU legislators. Therefore, when the Court decides that a Member State’s 
measure is a prima facie hindrance to a market freedom, it thereby con-
fers the regulatory competence to the EU and thus supports the central-
istic approach to the internal market.12 The wider the market freedoms, 
the more centralised the EU system is.
To a certain degree, constitutional discourse is more transparent in 
relation to EU legislation, where unanimity and the majority principle of 
decision-making have openly presented a discourse on the autonomy of 
the individual Member States. Therefore, even though the majority vot-
ing rule enables circumvention of a single Member State’s interests, and 
EU legislation per se limits national regulatory autonomy, centralism is 
not a necessary result of the EU legislator. In the light of this, various 
approaches to harmonisation at the EU level have been developed and 
recently new forms of regulation have become increasingly important. 
These emphasise not only the role of states in the legislative procedure 
but also that of civil society in general, which should through co-ordina-
tion at different levels lead to more legitimate rules. Within EU legisla-
tion, the tension between centralism and decentralism is evident from 
the discussions on negative and positive integration. According to the 
former, internal market rules should only require the Member States 
to abandon interference in interstate trade. Member States are still the 
main formulator of market policy in this respect, but under the condition 
that they do not discriminate against goods, people, services and capital 
from other Member States. On the other hand, positive integration re-
quires the active participation of Member States in terms of unifying do-
mestic legislation with that which has been adopted at the supranational 
level. In this situation, the market decision-maker is the supranational 
legislator, which adopts harmonising legislation, whereas the Member 
11  M Maduro, We The Court, The European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution: A Critical Reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty (Hart Publishing 1998) 103-
104. For a discussion on the Court of Justice’s role in the process of legal integration, see 
KA Armstrong ‘Legal Integration: Theorizing the Legal Dimension of European Integration’ 
(1998) 36(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 155.
12  In this regard, Snell emphasises that EU legislation is not conditioned upon a barrier on 
the side of the Member States. The existence of a barrier is a suffi cient, but not an essential 
condition for harmonisation. Snell (n 9) 33 n 10.
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States’ role is limited to its application. In this respect, it must be em-
phasised, however, that the delimitation between negative and positive 
integration and their transformation into a centralist or decentralist ap-
proach to the internal market is of a theoretical nature only. As proven 
by the Court’s case law, negative integration may also lead to consider-
able loss of national autonomy. Critics therefore warn that enforcement 
of TFEU provisions on fundamental freedoms has led to deregulation 
across the EU and the lowering of standards in the fi elds that are closely 
related to the internal market.13 On the other hand, harmonisation as an 
agent of positive integration does not necessarily exclude Member States’ 
competences in the market fi eld.
3 Economic liberalisation versus national tradition and culture
3.1 General remarks
The main minority values that have been impaired by the Court’s 
orientation towards the majority in the market, which has led to the 
most evident lack of democratic legitimacy, are those of national tradi-
tion and culture.14 Market rules directly refl ect national tradition, ie the 
way people live. This is true for national food laws determining certain 
ingredients or additives, for national family law that determines the ways 
families live, and also trade law, which determines the opening hours of 
shops and prohibits the selling of certain products (eg alcoholic drinks 
or erotic magazines). Given that the Treaty of Rome was of an economic 
nature, it was not expected to have a signifi cant effect in a broad sense 
upon the culture which determines the specifi c nature of individual 
Member States and the daily lives of their inhabitants. In reality, how-
ever, the Court has interpreted TFEU provisions in such a far-reaching 
way that market principles have begun to interfere in various aspects of 
people’s lives, not just in national trade legislation (irrespective of how 
broadly one may understand the term ‘trade’). It goes without saying that 
not all traditional rules are positive, and EU law removing some of them 
(eg regarding cruelty to animals) has been a welcome move. However, 
13  A McGee and S Weatherill, ‘The Evolution of the Single Market: Harmonisation or Liber-
alisation?’ (1990) 53 MLR 578, 581.
14  While many commentators have expressed their concern about the deregulatory poten-
tial of the Court’s decisions, Weatherill, on the other hand, fi nds that ‘European market 
integration confronts the dead wood of centuries of regulatory tradition in all the Member 
States … [R]egulatory renovation and a bonfi re of red-tape on the pyre of Article 34 TFEU 
constitutes the anticipated, even necessary, method. … [T]he European court is frequently 
asked to deal with the collision between, on the one hand, the making of a market for Eu-
rope and, on the other, national rules introduced for once sound reasons that have genera-
tions ago lost their purpose.’ S Weatherill, ‘Pre-emption, Harmonisation and the Distribu-
tion of Competence to Regulate the Internal Market’, in C Barnard and J Scott (eds), The 
Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing 2002) 41, 49.
124 Janja Hojnik: EU Internal Market and National Tradition and Culture...
the Court’s case law in particular has on many occasions interfered in 
national rules that are a source of pride. By doing this, it has triggered 
citizens’ concern and a fear of the erosion of their traditional values.
In this regard, it is arguable whether national tradition and cul-
ture as components of democratic legitimacy can compete with economic 
liberalisation, considering that tradition and culture are related to the 
peoples of Europe and are as such of a minority nature, whereas liber-
alisation has a supranational dimension. We believe that tradition and 
culture should be considered as values of signifi cant importance in com-
parison to economic effectiveness, as they are inherent to every Member 
State and serve as a basis for the identity-building of their citizens. For 
these reasons, Member States have an interest in establishing an ap-
propriate balance between economic liberalisation on the one hand and 
national tradition and culture on the other, as they all contribute to 
an appropriate quality of life. The appropriate balance does not refer to 
a situation where national tradition would always override free market 
interests. Nor does it refer to the opposite situation, but various solu-
tions in between that are established in practice, not as a consequence of 
one institution’s decision, but discussion among institutions and entities 
that represent various interests. Protection of tradition and culture is 
nowadays an unimportant political concept. Nevertheless, it contradicts 
all-encompassing harmonisation, not just at the EU level, but also at the 
Member State level.15 The following chapter discusses examples of estab-
lishing such a balance in the past. In many of them, the Court gave little 
or no importance to national tradition and culture.
3.2 Erosion of national tradition and culture in the EU Court’s 
case law
3.2.1 National food laws
One of the main areas where EU Member States substantially differ 
and which presents a source of their recognisability and national pride 
is their culinary tradition, determined by the local climate, and social 
and cultural factors. This fact has also led to a considerable amount of 
case law of the EU Court in the fi eld of food and beverages. The interlac-
ing of EU market law and national tradition concerning alcoholic drinks 
can be found in early tax case law. In the most famous case in this 
15  The position of the Assembly of the Council of Europe is that the identifi cation of na-
tional minorities and assurance of effective guarantees for their rights at the international 
level present the main way to remove ethnic confl icts and to establish peace in Europe. See 
eg C of E, Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 1335 (2003) 
of 19 June 2001.
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fi eld, Great Britain was taxing wine more heavily than beer.16 We may 
(dis)agree over the question of whether beer and wine are to be regarded 
as substitutes. However, the Commission alleged that Article 110 TFEU 
(former Article 90 EC) was being infringed, as wine was disproportion-
ately more heavily taxed than beer, considering that Britain had practi-
cally no domestic wine production. The British government, on the other 
hand, relied on traditional drinking patterns in Great Britain, claiming 
that beer was a popular beverage, whereas wine was a luxury product, 
thereby denying the substitutability of the two drinks. The Court did not 
accept this argument.
The majority of traditional national rules in the fi eld of food and 
beverages, however, are not to be found in the taxation fi eld, but in na-
tional laws regulating food ingredients and their presentation which fol-
low health and consumer protection goals. One of the fi rst cases in which 
a Member State relied on national tradition was Reinheitsgebot,17 where 
the German government claimed that a national tradition was the rea-
son for hindering trade. This tradition involved the prohibition of selling 
bier that contained any additives, and permitting only beer that was 
produced by the traditional (pure) German method. The German govern-
ment claimed before the Court that German consumers associated the 
designation bier with the beverage as prescribed in Biersteuergesetz, ie 
pure beer, and any other ingredients in the beer would be misleading to 
consumers. The German government quoted the reasoning of the Coun-
cil when justifying directives to harmonise standards for other products, 
in the sense that such a standard was necessary because practically 
every traditional drink could be produced artifi cially now.18 The Court 
did not accept this argument, holding that:
Consumers’ conceptions which vary from one Member State to the 
other are also likely to evolve in the course of time within a Mem-
ber State. The establishment of the common market is, it should be 
added, one of the factors that may play a major contributory role in 
that development.19
It follows that national traditions may not be static and also that 
EU Member States should not regulate them in such a way that they be-
come so, as this would harm the goals of the internal market. After this 
judgement, the media was full of protests by German beer producers and 
consumers claiming that ‘the Commission had dared to issue against 
16  Case 170/78 Commission v United Kingdom [1983] ECR 2265.
17  Case 178/84 Commission v Germany [1987] ECR 1227.
18  See E Steyger, National Traditions and European Community Law: Margarine and Mar-
riage (Dartmouth Publishing 1997) 34.
19  Commission v Germany (n 17) para 32.
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the superior quality of German beer by attacking before this Court rules 
on purity dating back to the time of Martin Luther.’20
Since pasta has a similar signifi cance in terms of national pride 
in Italy as beer does in Germany, Italians also began to protest when a 
magistrate from Bolzano referred for preliminary ruling the question of 
whether traditional Italian pasta rules were in accordance with EU law. 
In Italy, special durum wheat (grano duro) was used to prepare pasta. 
Italian law prohibited the marketing of any other kind of wheat. With the 
support of Advocate General Mancini,21 the Italian government main-
tained that the prohibition was necessary to protect Italian customers 
from buying and eating low-quality pasta.22 The Advocate General ex-
plained his opinion by saying that those that do not know Italy and Ital-
ian may think that the terms pasta, tipi di pasta and paste mean the 
same thing, even though this is not true. Relying on an encyclopaedia, 
he emphasised that pasta in the singular and paste in the plural have 
different meanings, and that only Italians knew the correct meaning 
of the words spaghetti, vermicelli, bucatini, maccheroni, rigatoni, fusilli, 
penne, linguine, orecchiette, malloreddus, etc.23 Consequently, consider-
ing the importance of pasta for Italians, the Advocate General proposed 
that the Court confi rm the Italian law on durum wheat. However, the 
Court did not accept the reasoning and concluded that the law presented 
an unjustifi able measure having an equivalent effect to quantitative re-
strictions. The Italian market therefore had to open up to pasta made 
from different wheat.24
3.2.2 Traditional labelling and packaging
The most important tradition of the EU Member States related to 
products is the language in which products are labelled. Considering 
the many languages that exist in the EU, it is a demanding job to la-
bel all the products’ ingredients correctly when trading across the EU. 
Consequently, a directive25 stipulates that Member States may prohibit 
20  Case 407/85 Drei Glocken v USL Centro-Sud [1988] ECR 4233 Opinion of AG Mancini.
21  Opinion of AG Mancini (n 20).
22  Pasta made of durum wheat does not stick together after cooking.
23  The Advocate General on the other hand acknowledged that the purpose of Italian leg-
islation was also to encourage the production of hard wheat, which in certain regions of 
Mezzogiorno is the only successful crop.
24  See Case 90/86 Criminal Proceedings against Zoni [1988] ECR 4285. Giorgio Zoni was 
prosecuted for importing wheat from Germany which was a mixture of ordinary and durum 
wheat.
25  Council Directive 79/112/EEC of 18 December 1978 on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs for 
sale to the ultimate consumer, OJ 1979 L33/1.
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the marketing of products that do not contain information on the label 
which is in a ‘language easy to understand for the customer’.26 Some 
Member States have interpreted this provision as meaning ‘in the offi cial 
language’. Belgium in this respect stipulated that the language used on 
the labels of food should be that of the area in which the food is offered 
for sale.27 Belgium has a rich history of language disputes and three 
offi cial languages at the present time, therefore food producers had to 
provide for three different labels to be able to market their products in 
their own country. The Court did not accept the interpretation of the 
Belgian government and ruled that the directive does not allow Member 
States to require labels in their own language if another language could 
be considered understandable. The judgment was severely criticised, not 
only because the protection of consumers might be jeopardised, but also 
because of its negative meaning for the protection of native languages.28
A slightly different, but nationally no less sensitive question is Mem-
ber States’ competence to reserve certain designations of origin for prod-
ucts coming from a certain region and consequently to allow them to 
refuse to import products of other Member States for the reason that the 
latter bear a similar name. The national rules concerning designations 
of origin derive from the national pride of typical national or regional 
specialties that are usually produced according to traditional methods.29 
The products derive their special status from their names and origins. 
Nevertheless, many of these products are imitated by producers in other 
Member States. The question if and what kind of names may be reserved 
by Member States has led to numerous judgments of the Court. The lat-
ter in general has ruled that names can be protected only if the quali-
ties and characteristics of the product concerned actually depend on its 
geographic origins.30 In this regard, a lot of attention was given to the 
feta cheese saga. Disputes over the use of the name feta began before the 
Court over two decades ago,31 when a question was referred to the Court 
whether this name could be used for certain cheeses made from cow’s 
milk.32 Originally, the name feta was used for Greek cheese made from 
sheep or goat’s milk and produced according to a traditional produc-
26  Council Directive 79/112/EEC (n 25) Article 14.
27  Case C-369/89 Piagème v Peeters [1991] ECR I-2971. The case later came before the 
Court again: Case C-85/94 Piagème v Peeters II [1995] ECR I-2955.
28  Steyger (n 18) 40. See also Case 298/87 Smanor SA [1988] ECR 4489.
29  Steyger (n 18) 42.
30  Case 12/74 Commission v Germany (Sekt and Weinbrand) [1975] ECR 181.
31  In Greece, a national court had already decided in 1987 that feta may only be used for 
Greek cheese.
32  Case C- 317/95 Canadene Cheese Trading AMBA cs v Ypourgou Emporiou [1997] ECR 
I-4681.
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tion process. Over the years, Danish, German and other imitations of 
this cheese from cow’s milk emerged and were good enough to convince 
Greeks to import it. The question for the Court was whether the name 
feta could be reserved for the traditional cheese made of sheep or goat’s 
milk and whether the Greek authorities could stipulate that the import-
ed cheese carry a different name. The opinion of the Advocate General 
was that national legislation that prohibited the sale of cheese under the 
name feta which was legitimately produced and marketed under this 
name in another Member State was a measure having equivalent effect 
to quantitative restrictions, which could not be justifi ed.33 However, after 
additional research and a long series of disputes the Court fi nally ruled 
that numerous factors show that the characteristics of feta are an es-
sential result of a defi ned geographical area. In this regard, the Greek 
government submitted a specifi cation of numerous natural and human 
factors that give feta its specifi c characteristics, such as the quantity 
of sun, fl uctuations in temperature, seasonal migration of animals, in-
creased grazing and vegetation. These specifi cs led the Court to the con-
clusion that the word feta does not have a generic character.34 Its decision 
was a source of widespread approval among Greeks and serves as an 
example of where the Court considered a minority Greek interest over the 
majority interest of other states where this famous cheese was imitated.
In addition, decisions on what should be regulated and what not 
follow from national traditions. Some aspects of this tradition are reli-
giously inspired, others stem from morality and culture. These rules in 
general fall within the competence of the Member States. However, they 
cannot avoid the Court’s interference. The latter has often considered 
cases regarding the closing times of shops, and questions regarding me-
dia, advertising, gambling, etc.
3.2.3 Closing times of shops
National rules on closing hours for shops generally aim to protect 
workers. Additionally, in some Member States legislation on when shops 
should be closed have a more traditional background. The traditional 
Sunday closing in several Member States is closely related to the Chris-
tian religion. Should this legislation only protect workers, the shops 
could easily be closed any other day of the week. Despite Europe’s major-
33  Case C-317/95 Canadane Cheese Trading v Greece [1997] ECR I-4681 Opinion of AG 
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer. Case removed from the register.
34  Joined Cases C-465/02 and C-466/02 Germany and Denmark v Commission [2005] ECR 
I-9115. For comments, see R Knaak, ‘Gemeinschaftsweiter Schutz der Bezeichnung „Feta“ 
für Erzeugnisse aus Griechenland‘ (2006), Zeitschrift für das gesamte Lebensmittelrecht 
59; J Reed, ‘Feta: A Cheese or a Fudge? Federal Republic of Germany v Commission’ (2006) 
European Intellectual Property Review 535.
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ity attachment to Christianity, rules in this respect vary between Member 
States.35 These differences have led to numerous attempts to abolish man-
datory Sunday closing regulations in several Member States. According 
to the claimants, these rules infringed upon the free movement of goods, 
as customers would avoid areas in which shops were closed on Sundays 
and prefer those where shops were open. The Court held in Torfaen36 that 
Article 34 TFEU covers not only product regulations but also measures 
regulating market circumstances. The British government invoked his-
torical reasons to explain the English closing of shops on Sundays and the 
differences between English and Scots law, which permitted the opening 
of shops on Sundays. In Conforama,37 where the French government had 
to defend its rules on shops closing, the claimant admitted that French 
law refl ected religious considerations which had been infl uential in 1906, 
when the law was introduced, but also claimed that the law was out of 
date and should be replaced by prescribing a weekly rest period in general 
instead of confi ning it to Sundays. Although the Court decided that these 
rules prima facie hindered the free movement of goods, it nevertheless 
dismissed the claimant’s arguments by holding that these rules refl ected 
certain choices particular to national or regional socio-cultural character-
istics which were for the Member States to make.
Even though the fi nal decision of the Court is democratically legiti-
mate, the same does not hold for its broad interpretation of Article 34 
TFEU, which included rules that are completely non-discriminatory and 
have only a very distant effect on cross-border trade, or the fact that the 
Court reserved for itself the competence to decide on the legitimacy and 
proportionality of national measures. The argument in fact shows that 
such rules do not hinder cross-border trade at all, as the domestic and 
imported goods within a Member State are in a completely equal posi-
tion. In this regard, it may be emphasised that in the USA rules on rest 
days are within the states’ competence and have never been challenged 
as a hindrance to trade among states in contrast to the commercial 
clause.38 The challenged rules have been considered by the US Supreme 
35  At this point, it is not clear why shops are closed on Sundays in England, Germany and 
the Netherlands, which are predominantly Protestant, whereas they are mostly open in 
Belgium and several other Catholic states.
36  Case 145/88 Torfaen BC v B&Q [1989] ECR 3851.
37  Case C-312/89 Conforama [1991] ECR I-991.
38  Maduro (n 11) 92. Prohibition of Sunday trading was not considered as a barrier to the 
internal market even in Great Britain, where England enacted its well-known Sunday Trad-
ing Act but Scotland does not have similar rules on Sunday trading. This difference was 
not considered as a barrier to free trade between England and Scotland that would need 
justifi cation. See T Burke and JR Shackleton, ‘Sunday: The Issues in Sunday Trading’, 
Adam Smith Institute (1989) 22 <http://www.adamsmith.org/sites/default/fi les/images/
uploads/publications/Sunday,_Sunday.pdf> accessed 28 September 2012.
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Court only from the point of view of freedom of religion, but also in this 
respect the Supreme Court did not challenge the states’ competence in 
the fi eld.39
Numerous national traditions die out for reasons of globalisation 
without the EU’s institutions expressly requiring it. For example, Span-
ish accession to the European Economic Area required the adjustment 
of their inhabitants to a shorter lunch time as is usual in other Mem-
ber States. Consequently, their traditional working day with three hours 
lunch time for siesta (a meal and a nap) quickly began to disappear. 
Thus, in January 2006 the Spanish government adopted a rule that all 
federal offi ces offi cially have only a 45-minute lunch break. The private 
sector followed this practice. This required numerous changes, from the 
working time of restaurants to the main TV news.40 Globalisation there-
fore eliminates traditions, even though this means a ‘push back from a 
cultural standpoint.’41 However, this is only slowly coming into practice 
given the deep roots in Spanish workers’ mentality.
3.2.4 National heritage
Similar to the aforementioned legal fi elds, EU law has also surprised 
Member States in the fi eld of national heritage. In the sixties, Italy intro-
duced a law which in some cases prohibited the export of cultural heri-
tage and in others required the exporter to pay a tax calculated on the 
basis of the market value of the objects concerned. Italy claimed before 
the Court that items of artistic, historical or ethnographic interest were 
not goods in the ordinary sense and were therefore not subject to the 
Treaty provisions on the free movement of goods.42 The Court dismissed 
this argument by ruling that ‘goods … must be understood [as] products 
which can be valued in money and which are capable, as such, of form-
ing the subject of [a] commercial transaction.’43 As a consequence, the 
protection of national heritage cannot be achieved by levying charges 
on protected objects, as they are considered as charges of equivalent ef-
fect to customs duties. Nevertheless, national heritage can be protected 
through a prohibition on export, as justifi ed by a specifi c reason pro-
39  Braunfeld v Brown 366 US 599 (1961).
40  JW Anderson and J Green, ‘Shaking Spain out of its Siesta, Law Seeks to Put Nation 
on Same Schedule as Rest of EU’ Washington Post (23 April 2006) <http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/22/AR2006042201123.html> accessed 15 
September 2011.
41  J Deschenaux, ‘Less Time for Lunch: The Siesta in Spain is Disappearing under the 
Pressures of International Business and Big City Communing’ (HR Magazine 2008).
42  Case 7/68 Commission v Italy [1968] ECR 423.
43  Commission v Italy (n 42) para 428.
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vided in Article 36 TFEU.44 Hence, Member States may prevent tourists 
or other buyers from exporting national heritage, but it is not allowed to 
make money out of such exports.
A kind of reverse case, however, occurred in Ireland, which encour-
aged tourists to buy traditional domestic products as souvenirs. Irish 
law required foreign products of typical Irish souvenirs to be stamped 
with an indication of origin. The purpose of the rule was to protect the 
domestic souvenir industry and tourists who might feel cheated upon 
discovering that their valued Irish souvenir was actually made in Den-
mark or even Taiwan.45 The Court had no mercy with these aims and 
considered the rule directly discriminatory, so that reliance on the rule 
of reason was not even possible. Article 36 TFEU was not applicable to 
the facts of the case.46 The decision is disputable from the standpoint 
of consumer protection, while the Court’s defi nition of a souvenir (for 
which the place of purchase, not the place of production prevails) is not 
legitimate.47
3.2.5 Media law and the fi lm industry
Strong emotions rooted in traditional attitudes in the Member States 
were also raised in relation to the Court’s case law in the area of media 
law. Audiovisual media have a long tradition of state intervention in Eu-
rope. Consequently, in several Member States the commercialisation of 
television is still regarded as harmful to the people, national culture and 
contrary to general state interests.48 Despite its endeavours to encour-
age competition in as many areas as possible, EU law does not prohibit 
public television as such. Since broadcasting may be seen as a public 
service, Member States fully retain the power to reserve the right to 
broadcast for the government or to prohibit certain pornographic or vio-
44  Because of Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural 
objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State [1993] OJ 1993 L74/74, 
Article 36 TFEU is no longer applicable in this fi eld.
45  Steyger (n 18) 71.
46  Case 113/80 Commission v Ireland [1981] ECR 1625.
47  Protection of national heritage was also at issue in three cases concerning tourist guides: 
Case C-145/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR I-659; Case C-180/89 Commission v Italy 
[1991] ECR I-709; Case C-198/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR I-727.
48  Steyger (n 18) 73. Steyger emphasises that the reasons for certain states prohibiting 
commercial television in favour of the preservation of state television has not always fol-
lowed from a genuine concern for the well-being of the people watching. As long as broad-
casting is kept in the hands of the government, that same government is able to control the 
issues broadcast. State television may in circumstances where the freedom of press is not 
guaranteed offer the government the opportunity to censor broadcasts.
132 Janja Hojnik: EU Internal Market and National Tradition and Culture...
lent programmes or commercials.49 Given that the application of Article 
56 TFEU, which guarantees free movement of services, presupposes a 
cross-border element, internal domestic broadcasting did not interfere 
with Community law. This changed, however, as new technology facili-
tated cross-border broadcasting, which was quickly embraced by adver-
tising agencies. Consequently, in the Flemish Cable Decree case,50 which 
prohibited broadcasting from bodies from other Member States, the Bel-
gian government invoked the purpose of cultural policy, ie preservation 
of pluralism of the press, which profi ted from the advertising revenues 
from national companies, and also the preservation of national artistic 
heritage. The Court held that the decree was purely protectionist and 
thus unjustifi able.
3.2.6 Morality and family values
At the time of the adoption of the Treaty of Rome, probably nobody 
expected that EU law might infl uence national attitudes towards morality, 
sex and family values, especially considering that at that time it was not 
generally acceptable for individuals to rely directly on Treaty provisions 
before the national courts to invoke their rights. Recognition of this right 
together with changes in relation to sex and the family gradually led to the 
considerable impact of EU law on these values over the decades.
In its case law, the Court held that the morally disputable nature of 
certain goods or services does not exclude the application of the rules on 
the internal market. Even in the fi eld of free movement of goods, where 
the TFEU expressly recognises a public morality derogation, the Court 
ruled in Conegate51 that reliance on public morality is not permitted in 
each case, especially not when the goods are legally produced and mar-
keted in the home state.52 In the fi eld of services, the Court also classi-
fi ed indecent services under the TFEU. The Court does not substitute 
a moral decision of the legislator of the state where a specifi c activity is 
legitimate. Consequently, in the Grogan case53 the Court decided that 
49  See Article 9 of Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative ac-
tion in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive) OJ 2010 L95/1, which provides certain specifi c requirements for 
such programmes.
50  Case C-211/91 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-6757.
51  Case 121/85 Conegate Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1986] ECR 1007.
52  In Conegate, reference to Article 36 TFEU was made in relation to confi scation of a 
number of infl atable dolls and certain other objects imported from Germany for reasons of 
their indecency.
53  Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Grogan 
[1991] ECR I-4685.
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termination of pregnancy, which is legally performed in several Member 
States, is a service as defi ned in the TFEU. In addition, in Schindler54 
the Court ruled that lottery services, even though strictly regulated in 
several Member States, are not per se prohibited and that in the United 
Kingdom, which was considered in the case, small-scale lotteries were 
also allowed. According to the Court, lotteries and other types of gam-
bling are in general considered as harmful.55 Nevertheless, they are not 
prohibited in all Member States and thus fall within the scope of the 
principle of the free movement of services,56 regardless of the fact that 
the European Council in Edinburgh in 1992 decided that the EU would 
not regulate games of chance, as it was more appropriate and in line with 
the subsidiarity principle that Member States alone regulated this fi eld.
The Court adopted the strictest approach towards the national views 
on morality in the fi eld of free movement of people. The most obvious 
case in this respect is Adoui en Cornuaille,57 which concerned two French 
prostitutes working in Belgium. When the two women applied for resi-
dence permits, the Belgian government expelled them from Belgium for 
reasons of their personal behaviour, which was considered of doubtful 
morality, thereby requiring the need to protect public order. In general, 
policy regarding prostitution was left to the local authorities, and accord-
ing to the city of Liège the women were considered as delinquents. The 
fi rst interesting point in the Court’s decision refers to the fact that the 
Court ruled that even prostitution must be considered as work in terms 
of Article 45 TFEU. Furthermore, the Court held that expulsion for rea-
sons of public policy could only be regarded as justifi ed if the conduct 
concerned constituted a genuine and suffi ciently serious threat to public 
order. Since the Belgian authorities did nothing to effectively combat 
prostitution, the behaviour of the French women was not a suffi cient 
reason for expulsion.
In this regard, the Cornwall County Council case58 should also be 
mentioned. It dealt with the effects of sex change on the employment 
rights of the person concerned. Nearly a year after beginning employ-
ment, the person concerned informed the management of an educational 
institution of his intention to change sex, and began to wear women’s 
54  Case C-275/92 Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v Gerhart Schindler in Jörg Schindler 
[1994] ECR I-1039. On this case, see L Gormley, ‘Reasoning Renounced? The Remarkable 
Judgment in Keck & Mithouard’ (1994) European Business Law Review 63.
55  Schindler (n 54) paras 31-33. Among the main reasons for this are the high probability 
of fraud and money laundering as well as the danger of excessive gambling of individuals, 
which may have long-term social effects (addiction, bad social position of the family, etc.)
56  See also Case C-243/01 Piergiorgio Gambelli and others [2003] ECR I-13031.
57  Joined Cases 115&116/81 Adoui and Cornuaille v Belgium [1982] ECR 1665.
58  Case C-13/94 P v S & Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143.
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clothing, which was followed by an operation to obtain the physical attri-
butes of a woman. Before the operations began, the person received three 
months’ notice of termination of employment. In his lawsuit against the 
employer, he claimed that he was the victim of sex discrimination, while 
the employer claimed that his/her employment had ended as his/her 
position had become redundant. The national court ruled that the sex 
change was in fact the real reason for dismissal. However, such a situ-
ation was not considered as discrimination under the English Sex Dis-
crimination Act. The national court was not sure whether it represented 
discrimination under Directive 76/207/EEC.59 The Court interpreted 
the directive broadly and proclaimed the principle of equality as one of 
the fundamental principles of EU law, also ruling the dismissal had oc-
curred because of the sex change.
3.3 Democratic defi cit of EU legislation
Like the Court’s case law, EU legislation has also encroached upon 
various national customs. In this regard, the Directive on units of mea-
surement60 should be pointed out. This stipulates that the metre is the 
offi cial unit for measuring lengths and the kilogramme for measuring 
weights, and does not mention English units of measurement. Conse-
quently, in 1994 Great Britain adopted new rules to amend the Weights 
and Measures Act of 1985 so as to prohibit the use of English units of 
measurement for commercial purposes, except as an ancillary label to 
decimal units of measurement. This amendment was highly criticised 
in Great Britain, which might be explained by the opinion Napoleon ex-
pressed in relation to the changes of units of measurement proposed by 
the Paris Academy of Science: ‘Nothing is more contrary to the organi-
zation of the mind, of the memory, and of the imagination. … The new 
system of weights and measures will be a stumbling block for several 
generations. … It’s just tormenting the people with trivia.’61
What the French emperor refused was imposed on the British by the 
above-mentioned directive, despite being considered a cultural invasion. 
59  Repealed by Council Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of 
equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation (recast) [2006] OJ 2006 L204/23.
60  Council Directive 80/181/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to units of measurement and on the repeal of Directive 71/354/EEC [1979] OJ 
1980 L39/40, as amended.
61  See P Seymour, ‘Drastic Measures: The Metric Assault on American Standards’ (Ameri-
cans for Customary Weight & Measure 2001) <www.bwmaonline.com/ACWM.htm> accessed 
15 April 2011.
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This can be deducted from Thoburn and Others,62 known as the ‘metric 
martyrs’, which challenged the legality of the changes before the English 
courts. Thoburn sold fruit and vegetables using English units of mea-
surement scales, as this was more convenient for his customers, but was 
prosecuted for this. Before the judgment was published, Thoburn said: 
‘All I did was sell a pound of bananas to a woman who asked for a pound 
of bananas - what’s wrong with that?’63 The court, however, explained 
that the judges realised that the parties before them were hardworking 
citizens, but that ‘[a]ll the specifi c rights and obligations which EU law 
creates are by the European Communities Act incorporated into our do-
mestic law and rank supreme.’ Making it clear that no loopholes existed, 
Lord Justice Laws said, ‘[t]hat is, anything in our substantive law incon-
sistent with any of these rights and obligations is abrogated or must be 
modifi ed to avoid inconsistency.’ He added that ‘our imperial measures, 
much loved of many, seem to face extinction’.64 Neil Herron, spokesman 
for the Metric Martyr Defence Fund, said that the case showed that an 
Act of Parliament could be overruled by a ‘mere directive’ from ‘an entity, 
a gathering of unelected bureaucrats over which we have no democratic 
control’.65 The critics of the judgment also emphasised that it was diffi -
cult to understand why it was hard to have an internal market with two 
units to measure weight, when the UK internal market had functioned 
this way ever since 1864.66 In this regard, Steyger also quotes the follow-
ing words of a British Member of Parliament from the mid-1980s: 
The Europeans have gone too far. They are now threatening the Brit-
ish sausage. They want to standardise it, by which they mean they’ll 
force the British people to eat salami and bratwurst and other gar-
lic-ridden greasy foods that are TOTALLY ALIEN to the British way 
of life.67
62  Thoburn v Sunderland City Council, Hunt v Hackney London Borough Council, Harman 
and Another v Cornwall County Council, Collins v Sutton London Borough Council [2002] 
EWHC 195 (Admin), [2002] 3 WLR 247.
63  See B Dunaway, ‘A Better Standard?’ (LewRockwell.com 2001) <http://www.lewrock-
well.com/orig/dunaway2.html> accessed 15 April 2011.
64  See also R v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) (C-213/89) [1991] 
1 AC 603, 658-659, where Lord Bridge Harwich emphasised the danger of a takeover of the 
national parliament’s sovereignty by EU institutions assisted by the national courts enforc-
ing EU law.
65  ‘“Metric martyrs”’ lose court battle’ BBC News (18 February 2002) <http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1826503.stm> accessed 9 September 2011.
66  See A Judd, ‘What MPs didn’t Tell you about the Common Market’ (Metric Martyrs De-
fence Fund 2005) <http://www.metricmartyrs.sageweb.co.uk/heath.htm> accessed 15 
September 2006.
67  Steyger (n 18) 1.
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4 The internal market in the light of the subsidiarity principle 
Although the internal market is benefi cial to all Member States, its 
scope and effect upon other important national values, such as autono-
my, tradition and culture are contentious. A certain degree of uniformity 
and the removal of hindrances are necessary for the EU economy, but 
still it is an undeniable fact that the Member States are diverse and thus 
uniform rules are not always appropriate from the democratic legitimacy 
point of view. For this reason, the choice between various institutional 
alternatives in the EU market cannot always be based on economic effec-
tiveness alone. One must also consider other values that are more easily 
achieved when EU law recognises certain Member State competences in 
the fi eld of market law.
The disparity between uniform market rules in the EU and demands 
for democratic legitimacy was given its legal manifestation by the Treaty of 
Maastricht, which expressed Member States’ reservations about enhanced 
integration through the principle of subsidiarity. This principle presents 
the foundation upon which Member States may advocate decentralism 
and the preservation of traditional rules and thereby keep certain compe-
tences at the national level. This principle requires decisions to be adopted 
as close to citizens as possible, and that in fi elds that are not within its ex-
clusive competence, the EU acts only when Member States cannot achieve 
satisfactory results.68 As such, the principle of subsidiarity is an impor-
tant component of the democratic legitimacy that is expected from modern 
legal systems. The principle of subsidiarity imposes rules on the division 
of competences between Member States and EU institutions. According 
to this principle, the latter may only have the competence to act in those 
areas that cannot be solved effectively at lower levels of government. It is 
thus the most reassuring principle for the democratic legitimacy of the de-
cision-making processes in the EU and thereby for the diversity of adopted 
rules.69 As Pernice points out, subsidiarity in Europe is designed ‘to pre-
serve, to the [greatest] possible extent, the cultural and political identities 
of the Member States that have decided not to merge into a great European 
“melting pot” governed by a centralist bureaucracy’.70
68  Article 5(3) TEU states: ‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be suffi ciently achieved by the Member States, either at central 
level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.’
69  J Scott and DM Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the 
European Union’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1, 8.
70  See GL Neuman, ‘Subsidiarity, Harmonization and Their Values: Convergence and Di-
vergence in Europe and the United States’ (1996) 2 Columbia Journal of European Law 
573 n 13.
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However, the problem with this principle is that it was included in 
the Treaties as a political compromise to assure acceptance of the Treaty 
of Maastricht by the Member States and not actually to limit the compe-
tences of EU institutions. This is evident from the Commission’s opinion 
of 1992 that the four fundamental freedoms of the internal market fall 
among the exclusive competences of the EU.71 Such a classifi cation would 
release the Commission from having to justify an enormous share of its 
legislative competences on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. In 
this regard, Toth advocated that the EU has exclusive competence in all 
the areas in which it is competent to act, including the internal market, 
and that in reality there cannot be a concept called shared competence.72 
Accordingly, in 1995 in Bosman,73 the Court concluded that fundamen-
tal freedoms, such as the free movement of people, are not subject to the 
subsidiarity review.74
Nevertheless, after expressing doubts about the real importance of 
subsidiarity, legal theory gradually began to emphasise that subsidiarity 
should be taken more seriously,75 and thus it has lately transformed from 
a political into a legal principle that should ensure a more democratically 
legitimate EU legal system. In this regard, the Lisbon Treaty also clas-
sifi ed the internal market as an area of shared competences, thereby 
formally recognising the importance of subsidiarity in the fi eld of the 
internal market. This demonstrates a mental leap towards a wholly more 
democratic EU system.76 Accordingly, the recognition that the internal 
market is not within the exclusive competence of the EU, and that the 
71  Commission, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity’, Commission Communication to the Council 
and the European Parliament, SEC (92) 1990 fi nal, 27 October 1992. See also G de Burca, 
‘Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Signifi cance after Amsterdam’ (1999) Harvard Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 7/99, 20.
72  AG Toth, ‘A Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity’ in D O’Keeffe and P Twomey (eds), Legal Is-
sues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law Publishing 1994).
73  Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Bosman 
[1995] ECR I-4921.
74  The Court thereby rejected the argument of the German government that the principle of 
subsidiarity requires such an interpretation of Article 45 TFEU that it does not bind private 
organisations, such as UEFA.
75  Especially after the Court expressed its resistance to the principle of subsidiarity (eg 
Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I-5755). See G Bermann, ‘Taking Sub-
sidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States’ (1994) 
94 Columbia Law Review 332; N Bernard, ‘Discrimination and Free Movement in EC Law’ 
(1996) 45 ICLQ 82; T Schilling, ‘A New Dimension of Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a Rule 
and a Principle’, Yearbook of European Law (1994) 203.
76  This is further demonstrated by the rephrased national identity guarantee under Article 
4(2) TEU. For a discussion on whether this guarantee has any consequences in internal 
market case law, see S Rodin, ‘National Identity and Market Freedoms after The Treaty of 
Lisbon’ (2011) Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2005691> ac-
cessed 27 September 2012.
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EU and the Member States share competence in this fi eld does not pres-
ent by itself a threat to market functioning, as many neoliberals believe. 
The balance of power is certainly in favour of the EU, which may limit 
states’ competence in this fi eld through the principle of the supremacy of 
EU law. However, this does not mean that the internal market cannot be 
more the result of a stakeholder process, which would expressly recog-
nise the active role of the Member States in market regulation, thereby 
recognising the proper role of subsidiarity.
The main consequence of subsidiarity in terms of the choice be-
tween institutional alternatives in the fi eld of the internal market is in its 
requirement to limit centralism and recognise Member States’ primary 
role in market regulation, but under the condition that they do not dis-
criminate against people, goods and services from other Member States. 
Recognising the important role of subsidiarity in EU law leads to the view 
that the internal market does not require a market of completely uniform 
rules. The Court must shape public law doctrines in such a way that the 
centre of democratic legitimacy in the EU stays with the Member States. 
This is especially true for interpretation of EU competences from the 
TFEU. The US Supreme Court held in Chevron77 that American courts 
must (if Congress has not expressly regulated the issue concerned) adopt 
a permissible interpretation of the delegation of competence from demo-
cratically more legitimate and responsible levels of government to less 
legitimate ones.78 This permissible interpretation also requires that goals 
of an ideal market be substituted by the goal of a workable market. When 
considering other values besides economic liberalisation, the internal 
market may not be considered as a perfect market. As former judge Jann 
once said: ‘Discussions must concentrate on the common market that 
truly exists and not on the ideal market that has no failures. The lat-
ter simply does not exist.’79 Thus, the difference between a pure, ideal 
internal market and a workable internal market is not insignifi cant; rec-
ognition of differences between national markets makes it possible to 
take proper account of differences which the EU internal market should 
recognise. Examples of how to give priority to the concept of a workable 
market over that of an ideal market can be found in US market law. In 
many aspects, the US Supreme Court has been less strict in supporting 
the unifi cation of market law than the EU Court, which is evident from 
77  Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council Inc, 467 U S 837 (1984).
78  See also more recent case law where the US Supreme Court acknowledges broader state 
competences in the market fi eld: United Haulers Assn Inc v Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Mgmt Auth, 550 US 330 (2007); Department of Revenue of Kentucky v Davis, 553 US 328 
(2008).
79  K Tomasz, ‘Trybunal Sprawiedliwosci i integracja: Rozmowa z sędzią Trybunalu Peterem 
Jannem’ (2002) 2 Radca Prawny 95, 100.
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the fact that the Supreme Court dismissed the premise that ‘every ac-
tion by a State that has the effect of reducing in some manner the fl ow of 
goods in interstate commerce is potentially an impermissible burden’,80 
which in fact is the well-known Dassonville formula under EU law.81
In addition, application of the de minimis principle in the fi eld of eco-
nomic freedoms should be considered as a potential instrument for en-
hancing the democratic legitimacy of EU internal market rules. Perišin 
makes an important point in this respect by saying that 
times have changed since Dassonville and Cassis … and it is nowa-
days not necessary for Article (34) to be so broad as to cover all 
obstacles to trade, and the Court’s review over measures which are 
only remotely connected to the internal market would be unnec-
essarily burdensome on national regulatory autonomy, and would 
thus endanger the EU’s legitimacy.82 
The de minimis rule is thus a useful concept to reduce centralisation 
in the fi eld of the internal market and to balance free trade and national 
autonomy interests. Nevertheless, its application in this fi eld is by no 
means without problems.
Yet, there are more recent signs that EU law is evolving towards 
putting more emphasis on national identity. Advocate General Maduro 
found in Michaniki in 2008 that ‘the European Union is obliged to re-
spect the constitutional identity of the Member States’.83 Article 4(2) of 
the Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, is 
very clear about this by stipulating that the Union respect the ‘national 
identities [of Member States], inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional’. The Court also expressly recognised that 
the preservation of national identity ‘is a legitimate aim respected by the 
Community legal order’.84 However, it has often ruled that the restriction 
in the case in point was disproportionate as the interest pleaded could 
be effectively safeguarded by other means. However, in more recent rul-
ings, adopted after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Court 
is more sensitive towards national identity, even when it is in opposi-
80  Hughes v Alexandria Scrap Corp, 426 US 794 (1976).
81  See T Stein and E Sandalow, Courts and Free Markets, Perspectives from the United 
States and Europe, Vol 1 (Clarendon Press 1982) 25; C Barnard, ‘Restricting Restrictions: 
Lessons for the EU from the US?’(2009) 68 CLJ 575-606.
82  T Perišin, Free Movement of Goods and Limits of Regulatory Autonomy in the EU and WTO 
(Asser Press 2008) 39.
83  Case C-213/07 Michaniki AE v Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos 
Epikrateias [2008] ECR I-9999, Opinion of AG Maduro, para 31.
84  See Case C-473/93 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR I-3207, para 35.
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tion to free movement values.85 An example of this development is Sayn-
Wittgenstein,86 which concerned a woman with Austrian citizenship who 
was adopted by a German and who was not permitted to use the title of 
Fürstin in Austria. The reason for this was that the Verfassungsgerich-
tshof (Austrian Constitutional Court) held in 2003 that the Abolition of 
the Nobility Act of 1919, which has constitutional status and implements 
the principle of equal treatment, precludes an Austrian citizen from ac-
quiring a surname which includes a noble title by means of adoption by 
a German citizen who is permitted to bear that title as a constituent ele-
ment of his name. As Ms Sayn was an estate agent, she claimed that the 
impossibility of registering her civil status would impair her freedom to 
provide services. The Court noted that the European Union is to respect 
the national identities of its Member States, which includes the status of 
a State as a Republic. The Court therefore accepted that in the context of 
Austrian constitutional history, the Abolition of the Nobility Act may be 
regarded as a public policy justifi cation and accordingly, when balanced 
against the right of free movement of people, recognised under European 
Union law.87 The Court is thus slowly becoming more willing to preserve 
national autonomy and tradition.88
5 Conclusion
The paper highlights that the rules that mirror certain ways of life 
in individual Member States face considerable challenges under EU law. 
The equivocal defi nitions and goals of the Treaty have enabled the EU to 
infl uence unforeseen areas. Consequently, the four freedoms have had a 
signifi cant impact on people’s way of life. These provisions of the TFEU 
have, together with the EU Court’s case law, led to a considerable limita-
tion of autonomy and to the removal or adjustment of numerous national 
traditions. The positive integration of EU legislation has had similar re-
strictive effects on Member States’ sovereignty when regulating trade-
related and other issues. The effect of the all-encompassing uniformity 
of legal rules and EU law upon people’s way of life, and in certain areas 
intrusive interference in the values that are a source of national pride, 
confl ict with the essence of democratic legitimacy and must become a 
factor of institutional analysis.
85  Rodin (n 76) 16.
86  Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien [2010] ECR I-
13693.
87  Sayn-Wittgenstein (n 86) para 89.
88  See also Case C-391/09 Malgožata RuneviË-Vardyn and Łukasz Pawel Wardyn v Vilniaus 
miesto savivaldybe
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The principle of subsidiarity can in this respect apply a brake on the 
erosion of national competences. Bermann defi nes the values of subsid-
iarity as ‘self-determination and accountability, political liberty, fl exibil-
ity, preservation of identities, diversity and respect for internal divisions 
of component states’.89 This principle confers upon Member States the 
role of primary market regulator. However, this does not mean that su-
pranational institutions are excluded from acting in this fi eld. As such, 
the principle refl ects the multi-level governance system, which must also 
be recognised in the fi eld of the internal market. The principle of sub-
sidiarity is foremost a concept to assure high quality and democratically 
legitimate EU market law. It requires the determination of whether Mem-
ber States may effectively regulate certain matters and that the EU leg-
islator ex ante weighs the proposed rules. Certainly, this may slow down 
the legislative procedure and require greater justifi cation of Commission 
proposals. However, at the same time, it leads to better and more thor-
oughly considered legislation that more consistently considers national 
culture and tradition. As the present state of EU enthusiasm shows, the 
melting pot is not going to be a preferential standpoint of the majority of 
Europeans for decades to come. Even the most centralist EU institutions 
are aware of this fact. In his speech in Sofi a in 2007, Commissioner Mc-
Creevy emphasised: 
we need to accept that the nature of the game has changed. … The 
Single Market must become more decentralised …. We need to im-
prove the ownership in the Member States. And we must strengthen 
cooperation between the national and EU level’.90 
Today this is even more vital, considering that the economic crisis 
has strengthened Euroscepticism in most EU Member States, which is 
evident from increasing nationalism, lack of cross-border solidarity and 
negative attitudes towards imported goods and foreign workers and ser-
vice providers. Despite the fact that decentralisation of the EU internal 
market is contrary to the basic principles of EU legislation and the case 
law of the past two decades and seems, from the legal point of view, 
rather ambiguous, it is the result of a multi-dimensional division in the 
EU and its increasing diversity.
Furthermore, in a 2011 Green Paper, the Commission stated that 
regional and local markets are an essential meeting place for producers 
and consumers, as they provide the latter with access to a wide variety 
89  Bermann (n 75) 343.
90  C McCreevy, ‘The Future of the Single Market’ (Sofi a University, Sofi a, 14 May 2007)
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/308& format=H
TML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> accessed 22 July 2011.
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of products rooted in their traditions and ways of life.91 The previously 
mentioned Judge Jann held: 
today the Court is aware that the judges must establish a balance 
for a successful market. [On] one hand, we must do all we can to 
remove barriers, at the same time, however, we must be aware that 
there are national interests that must be protected, even when this 
protection means keeping certain barriers in the functioning of the 
ideal internal market.92 
Nevertheless, given the established market law of the EU it is dif-
fi cult to imagine that any of these institutions would expressly clear a 
Member State measure such as introducing traditional national break-
fast to schools where only food of local origin would be served. In the 
light of the famous Dassonville formula, such a measure would clearly 
be direct discrimination that cannot be justifi ed on the basis of Article 
36 TFEU. It is thus hard to see how national tradition and culture can 
comfortably exist within the internal market principles as currently in-
terpreted. In contrast to this, it should be more clearly refl ected in the 
law that the market is diverse and complex. In the light of this, national 
culture and tradition should effectively be integrated in the system of 
derogations to internal market principles and be treated as per se values. 
This would considerably improve EU market legitimacy, which will be es-
sential for strengthening the EU project post-crisis.
91  Commission, ‘Green Paper on promotion measures and information provision for agri-
cultural products: a reinforced value-added European strategy for promoting the tastes of 
Europe’ COM (2011) 436 fi nal 4-5.
92  Tomasz (n 79) 100.
